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Abstract
A single perturbation can pose the most natural images to
be misclassified by classifiers. In black-box setting, current
universal adversarial attack methods utilize substitute mod-
els to generate the perturbation, then apply the perturbation
to the attacked model. However, this transfer often produces
inferior results. In this study, we directly work in the black-
box setting to generate the universal adversarial perturbation.
Besides, we aim to design an adversary generating a single
perturbation having texture like stripes based on orthogonal
matrix, as the top convolutional layers are sensitive to stripes.
To this end, we propose an efficient Decision-based Univer-
sal Attack (DUAttack). With few data, the proposed adver-
sary computes the perturbation based solely on the final in-
ferred labels, but good transferability has been realized not
only across models but also span different vision tasks. The
effectiveness of DUAttack is validated through comparisons
with other state-of-the-art attacks. The efficiency of DUAt-
tack is also demonstrated on real world settings including the
Microsoft Azure. In addition, several representative defense
methods are struggling with DUAttack, indicating the practi-
cability of the proposed method1.
1 Introduction
Many challenging practical tasks such as image recogni-
tion (Szegedy et al. 2015; He et al. 2016), object detec-
tion (Ren et al. 2015; Liu et al. 2016a), semantic segmen-
tation (Sun et al. 2019) and so forth, are increasingly re-
lied on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). However, recent
studies have found that DNNs are vulnerable to adversar-
ial examples, images with subtle changes (Szegedy et al.
2013; Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Papernot
et al. 2017). Moreover, these constructed adversarial exam-
ples generalize well across networks (Papernot, McDaniel,
and Goodfellow 2016; Liu et al. 2016b). The usage of these
adversarial attacks in real-world applications is problematic,
and so motivates the studies on designing robust models re-
sistant to adversarial attacks (Buckman et al. 2018; Guo et al.
2017; Akhtar, Liu, and Mian 2018).
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2017)
first found a single perturbation that fools DNNs over mul-
tiple natural images. They constructed the image-agnostic
Copyright c© 2021, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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Figure 1: An example of the universal adversarial attack.
The universal attack first computes a single perturbation for
a classification task, then the perturbation can be added to
different natural images, yielding adversarial images. The
universal perturbation can be directly applied to different
systems such as object detection and face detection. Here,
our adversary only has access to the final labels returned
by the classifier, but the adversarial perturbation generalizes
well across data, models, and tasks. Pixel values of the per-
turbation are scaled for visibility.
perturbations by iteratively computing the directions in the
decision boundary of the classifier. Further, Khrulkov and
Oseledets (Khrulkov and Oseledets 2018) crafted the uni-
versal adversarial perturbations through finding the singular
vectors of the Jacobian matrices of hidden layers in a net-
work, while Hayes and Danezis (Hayes and Danezis 2018)
introduced a generative network for learning the universal
adversarial perturbations to fool an attacked model. These
works also show that the universal adversarial perturbations
constructed by a model can perform well on other models.
The application potential of the universal adversarial at-
tack is higher than the individual attack because the former
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method only needs to craft one perturbation for most natu-
ral images at a time, while the latter one needs to generate
the corresponding adversarial perturbation for every natu-
ral image. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the universal adversar-
ial attack can attack different systems using one perturba-
tion which is constructed for VGG16 (Simonyan and Zisser-
man 2014), the perturbation can be added to different nat-
ural images. A practical attack method should require as
little as possible knowledge of the attacked models, which
include training data, models weights, output probabilities
and hard labels (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018). How-
ever, existing universal adversarial attack methods need the
internal information of the attacked models. For achieving
black-box attack, this perturbation is applied to different
images and models based on the transferability of the ad-
versarial perturbation. Such a transfer will reduce the per-
formance of the universal perturbation. Therefore, the goal
of this study is to generate the perturbation in black-box
setting. Besides, these universal adversarial attack methods
compute the perturbation having random noise. But litera-
ture show that the top convlolutional layers are sensitive to
stripes (Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012). Athalye et
al. (Athalye et al. 2017) generated adversarial examples with
a few color stripe, and got strong misleading performance.
Therefore, we aim to use such sensitivity to craft a single
perturbation having stripes texture like the one in Fig 1. This
mechanism will improve the performance of universal per-
turbation in black-box setting, and also can be applied to
different images, models and tasks.
In this work, we propose a Decision-based Universal At-
tack (DUAttack) that has no access to the architecture of
models and class probabilities and scores. The proposed at-
tacker only has access to the top-1 inferred labels returned
by models, which are used to guide the direction for com-
puting the perturbation. However, with such a few access,
the experiments show that our adversary performs better
than the leading competitors, UAP (Universal Adversarial
Perturbations) (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2017) and Singlu-
arFool (Khrulkov and Oseledets 2018), which has knowl-
edge of the hidden layers of the attacked model. Moreover,
a single adversarial perturbation is generated for all nat-
ural images, but experiments show that our method have
higher transferability than methods that construct the corre-
sponding adversarial examples for every natural image, such
as SimBA (Simple Black-box Attack) (Guo et al. 2019).
Specifically, with a mere few training images, to craft per-
turbation having stripes texture, we iteratively sampling the
predefined orthogonal matrix as the update points, and alter-
ing the update vector based on its previous directions. Ex-
periments show that the proposed image-agnostic adversar-
ial attack not only generalizes well across models but also
performs well across different tasks. To recap, we propose
an algorithm for crafting image-agnostic adversarial pertur-
bation directly under the black-box setting. The main contri-
butions are as follows:
• Our adversary only has access to the top-1 labels returned
by models, which is the minimum access compared with
previous typical black-box attacks.
• Our adversary is the first decision-based universal adver-
sarial attack. It generates a single perturbation with stripes
texture for all natural images but can outperform the com-
petitive opponent that constructs adversarial examples for
every image.
• Our experiments not only show that the proposed method
generalizes well across images and models, but also per-
forms well across tasks on real-word settings.
2 Related work
Szegedy et al. (Szegedy et al. 2013) first found the vul-
nerability of deep neural networks to visually impercepti-
ble perturbations, despite their high accuracy in the context
of image classifications. Such adversarial examples can be
easily misclassified with high confidence. Even worse, Pa-
pernot et al. (Papernot, McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016)
showed that the same adversarial examples generated from
one model can fool multiple models. These interesting prop-
erties motivate researchers to study attacks and defenses for
deep neural networks (Akhtar and Mian 2018). In general,
adversarial attacks can be categorized into individual attacks
that construct image-specific perturbations and universal at-
tacks which craft an image-agnostic one.
2.1 Individual Attacks
Individual attacks construct adversarial perturbations for ev-
ery natural image. Among these attacks, gradient-based at-
tacks have access to the architecture of models. Goodfel-
low et al. (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014) proposed
FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method), a method computing
the gradients with respect to the input of the model. Kurakin
et al. (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016) proposed
BIM (Basic Iterative Method) which is an iterative version
of FGSM. FGSM takes a large step to update the perturba-
tion, instead, BIM iteratively takes small steps. FGSM and
BIM aim to find the adversarial examples increasing the loss
of the classifier, while DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi,
and Frossard 2016) constructed the perturbation with mini-
mal norm according to the decision boundaries of the classi-
fier. Carlini and Wagner (Carlini and Wagner 2017) also in-
tended to find quasi-imperceptible perturbations by restrict-
ing the `p(p = 0, 2,∞) norms of the perturbations. Mo-
tivated by the study on the optimization landscape, Madry
et al. (Madry et al. 2017) proposed PGD (Projected Gra-
dient Descent), an iterative method to project the perturba-
tions onto a ball of specified radius. Donget al. (Dong et al.
2017) proposed momentum iterative gradient-based meth-
ods which have good transferability.
Different from gradient-based attacks, score-based (Chen
et al. 2017; Li et al. 2019b; Guo et al. 2019; Moon, An, and
Song 2019; Alzantot et al. 2019) and decision-based (Bren-
del, Rauber, and Bethge 2017; Ilyas et al. 2018; Chen, Jor-
dan, and Wainwright 2019; Cheng et al. 2018) attacks only
access the class probabilities or the final class predictions.
Chen et al. (Chen et al. 2017) proposed ZOO (Zeroth Or-
der Optimization) which instead craft the adversarial ex-
amples by directly estimating the gradients of the attacked
model with zeroth order stochastic coordinate descent. Ilyas
et al. (Ilyas et al. 2018) showed an attack NES that access to
the probabilities and an attack NES-LO only access to top
k (k ≥ 1) labels. They estimated the gradients of the at-
tacked classifier using NES (Salimans et al. 2017) and then
applied PGD for generating adversarial examples. Also in-
spired by NES, instead of gradients estimation, Li et al. (Li
et al. 2019b) built a probability density distribution over
the `p ball centered around an input. They assumed that all
imperceptible adversarial examples of this input belong to
this ball. Likewise, without estimating the gradients, Guo
et al. (Guo et al. 2019) proposed a simple iterative tech-
nique SimBA (Simple Black-box Attack). They defined an
orthonormal basis and randomly select one, then added or
subtracted the chosen point to the input according to the
confidence scores. Having only access to the labels returned
by the attacked model, Brendel et al. (Brendel, Rauber, and
Bethge 2017) proposed Boundary Attack that first finds a
perturbation with large norms, and then reduces the pertur-
bation. Their attack almost needs no hyperparameter tun-
ing and performs closing to the gradient-based attacks. Chen
et al. (Chen, Jordan, and Wainwright 2019) proposed Hop-
SkipJump, an advanced version of Boundary Attack. They
estimated the gradient direction using the perturbations in-
spired by zeroth-order optimization.
2.2 Universal Attacks
Contrary to the individual attacks, universal attacks craft a
single perturbation for all benign images. Some of these
attacks require samples from the data to construct the uni-
versal perturbation (Chaubey et al. 2020; Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al. 2017, 2018; Khrulkov and Oseledets 2018; Hayes and
Danezis 2018; Reddy Mopuri et al. 2018; Poursaeed et al.
2018). Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.
2017) first introduced the universal adversarial perturba-
tion. They directly crafted the image-agnostic perturbation
through DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard
2016) and showed some interesting properties such as trans-
ferability across models. Khrulkov and Oseledets (Khrulkov
and Oseledets 2018) proposed to compute the so-called
(p, q)-singular vectors of the Jacobian matrices of feature
maps in the attacked model for generating the universal per-
turbation. Hayes and Danezis (Hayes and Danezis 2018) de-
signed universal adversarial networks based on a generator
to construct the universal adversarial perturbation.
Besides, some researchers study on crafting the data-free
universal adversarial perturbation (Mopuri, Garg, and Babu
2017; Reddy Mopuri, Krishna Uppala, and Venkatesh Babu
2018; Mopuri, Ganeshan, and Radhakrishnan 2018). Mop-
uri et al. (Mopuri, Garg, and Babu 2017) crafted the data-
independent universal adversarial perturbation by maximiz-
ing the mean activations at multiple layers of the attacked
model. Mopuri et al. (Reddy Mopuri, Krishna Uppala, and
Venkatesh Babu 2018) generated class impressions by start-
ing from a random noise and update the noise until the at-
tacked model misclassifies it with high confidence. Then
they utilized the class impressions as training data for a gen-
erator to construct the universal adversarial perturbation.
Methods above for constructing the universal adversar-
ial perturbation need the information about the attacked
model internals. In real-world systems, the adversary has
little chance to know about the attacked model internals. So
current universal attacks generate perturbation from a substi-
tute model, then apply the perturbation to the attacked mod-
els for achieving black-box attacks. However, such a transfer
will degrade the performance of the attacker. As such, we ex-
plore, in this paper, the construction of universal adversarial
perturbation directly in the back-box setting.
3 DUAttack
Notations and Preliminaries. Before introducing the pro-
posed method, we present the notations and preliminaries.
A scalar, vector and matrix are written as a, a and A re-
spectively. Below, we formalize the notions of universal per-
turbations and present the method for constructing the per-
turbations directly in the black-box setting. Suppose that U
denotes the distribution of the natural images in RH×W×C .
Let F(·) denote a classifier that maps each image X ∈ U
to its final estimated label y ∈ R. We aim to craft a pertur-
bation V ∈ RH×W×C which causes most images sampled
from the distribution U misclassified by the classifierF . The
universal perturbation V satisfies the following constraints:
P
X∼U
(F(X) 6= F(X+V)) ≥ δ s.t. ‖V‖p ≤ ζ, (1)
where δ ∈ (0, 1] quantifies the desired fooling ratio, p ∈
[1,∞), ‖·‖p and P(·) denote the `p norms and the probabil-
ity respectively, and the attack distance ζ ≥ 0 is a constant.
In this study, the hyper-parameters of the porposed method
DUAttack are the step size  and the number of iteration T .
Scenario. This study focuses on synthesizing the univer-
sal adversarial perturbation by decision-based attack. In cur-
rent studies, universal attacks need to use a substitute model
to generate the perturbation through gradient optimization
methods, then apply the perturbation to the attacked mod-
els for achieving the black-box attack. In our study, the pro-
posed method only access the inferred top-1 labels returned
by the attacked models. The attacker can generate the uni-
versal perturbation for the attacked models directly.
Algorithm. We now introduce the proposed method for
crafting the universal perturbations using Algorithm 1.
{Xi}(i = 1, 2, ..., N) = {X1,X2, ...,XN} is a set of clean
images sampled from the data distribution U , its number is
N . The direction for updating the perturbation of DUAttack
is inspired by SimBA (Guo et al. 2019), which is a pow-
erful query-based individual attack method. SimBA utilizes
the output probabilities returned by the attacked models, in-
stead, we only have access to the final inferred top-1 labels
y = F({Xi}) returned by the classifier. Besides, we de-
sign the orthogonal matrix and momentum-based optimiza-
tion for efficiently computing the universal perturbation. We
iteratively compute the universal perturbation V with the
Frobenius norm ζ, which can cause most test data different
from {Xi} misclassified by the attacked model.
Under the black-box setting, the key idea of DUAttack is
that the labels returned by the model can guide the direc-
tion for crafting the perturbation. See pseudo-code in Algo-
rithm 1, in each iteration, 1) at first, we randomly utilize an
Algorithm 1: Generating universal peturbation through
DUAttack
Input: Classifier F , the step size , the maximum
number of iterations T , and the desired
Frobenius norm of the perturbation δm, data
points {Xi}(i = 1, 2, ..., N) ∈ U , orthogonal
matrix Q ∈ RH×W×C and momentum matrix
M ∈ RH×W×C .
Output: Universal adversarial perturbation V
1 Initialization: V⇐ 0, M⇐ 0, Q⇐ E, k ⇐ 0 ;
2 for t← 1 to T do
3 random k ∈ [0,W );
4 Q← (ek, ek + 1, eW−1, e0, ..., ek−1);
5 vector rel ← 0, rer ← 0;
6 Vtl ← Vt−1 − (Q+ 0.9M);
7 Vtl = δmV
t−1/
∥∥Vt−1∥∥
F
;
8 rel ← F(X) 6= F(X−Vtl);
9 if sum(rel) = 0 then
10 Vt = Vtl ; break;
11 end
12 Vtr ← Vt−1 + (Q+ 0.9M);
13 Vtr = δmV
t−1/
∥∥Vt−1∥∥
F
;
14 rer ← F(X) 6= F(X+Vtr);
15 if sum(rer) = 0 then
16 Vt = Vtr; break;
17 end
18 if sum(rer) < sum(rel) then
19 M←M+ Q; Vt = Vtl ;
20 else
21 M←M− Q; Vt = Vtr;
22 end
23 t← t+ 1 ;
24 end
25 returnVt −X.
orthogonal matrix Q to decide which points should be al-
tered, compute the perturbation with a dynamical step size
∗Q+0.9∗M (0.9 is an empirical value), whereM records
the historical changes of the perturbation. 2) Secondly, to
make sure the perturbation will always satisfy the constraint
‖V‖F ≤ ζ, we further project the updated perturbation onto
a sphere centered at 0 and with a radius ζ. 3) Thirdly, we
subtract and add the adversarial examples with the pertur-
bation respectively, compare the final inferred labels F(X)
and F(X−V) or F(X+V) corresponding with the clean
inputX and adversarial inputX−V orX+V respectively,
and record the numbers rel and rer of adversarial examples
X−V and X+V that successfully fool the model respec-
tively. 4) Finally, we choose the larger one where adversarial
examples successfully make the model output labels differ-
ent from their counterparts do, and update the momentum
matrix M with these altered points in this iteration.
The proposed algorithm is simple yet practical. It can con-
vert to the targeted attack easily. The only hyper-parameters
of the proposed algorithm are the step size  and the itera-
tion numbers T . Besides, the desired `F norm of the pertur-
bation and the number of data points N used to construct
the universal adversarial perturbation are set by the need of
the attacker itself. The details about the constituents of the
proposed method are explained below.
Orthogonal matrix. In the black-box setting, we cannot ac-
cess the information such as gradients of the attacked mod-
els. The conventional methods usually estimate the gradients
based on optimization which often needs lots of queries, in-
stead, to craft a single perturbation having stripes texture
which let the top convolutional layers more sensitive, we
choose a orthogonal unit matrix to decide which pixels to
alter for crafting the universal adversarial perturbation.
The size of orthogonal unit matrix is the same as the in-
puts, and each column vector of the matrix is orthogonal.
For example, suppose that the resolution of one image is
H ×W , the size of the matrix will also be H ×W . We have
H×1 vector ei = (0 0 · · · 1 · · · 0)T (i = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,W −1)
where the entries in the i-th position of the vector is 1 and
other positions have 0. At each iteration, we randomly se-
lect a column vector and then move the whole matrix a few
steps to the left or right so that the selected vector can be the
first column vector. For instance, without loss of general-
ity, suppose that H = W , the initial orthogonal unit matrix
is (e0 e1 · · · eW−2 eW−1). In current iteration t = 1, we
choose the 2-th column vector e2, then the matrix will be
(e2 e3 · · · eW−1 e1 e0).
In the proposed method, in each iteration, we compute
one channel of the perturbation with the selected orthogonal
matrix. Thus, we alterW pixels of the perturbation one time.
Due to the randomness, every pixel has the same chance to
be altered after several iterations.
Update strategy. Previously, the selected pixels are all
changed with the same steps. In the proposed method, this
may cause the problem that some pixels will offset each
other due to the subtraction or plus in different iterations.
Therefore, inspired by the optimization method with mo-
mentum (Ruder 2016) in deep learning, we apply the same
idea here. The parameter of momentum is 0.9 in our method.
In general, the altered pixels have dynamical step size, it
can restrain such offset and reduce the number of queries.
A comparison between different update strategies including
the random sampling and the efficient variant of covariance
matrix adaptation evolution strategy (CMAES) (Dong et al.
2019) can be seen in Section 4.6.
Projection. Notice that our final goal is to find a single per-
turbation for all natural images, the Frobenius norm of the
perturbation can be large under no constraints.
For Algorithm 1, images in a mini-batch update the per-
turbation with . Given that we use N images to construct
the universal adversarial perturbation and a mini-batch has
n images, the perturbation will be updated by q = dN/ne
times. The size of the perturbationV isH×W×C, the max-
imum number of iterations is T . The size of the unit matrix
Q is H ×W . We assume that the perturbation is updated in
the same direction every time and H = W = m, we do not
consider the momentum term here, therefore the Frobenius
norm of the final perturbation can be
δ = ‖V‖F =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
q∑
i=1
T∑
j=1
Q
∥∥∥∥∥∥
F
. (2)
So the norm of the perturbation will be
δ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
q∑
i=1
T∑
j=1
Q
∥∥∥∥∥∥
F
≤ 
√
qTm. (3)
Notice that m is equal to the size of the images, the norm
of the perturbation and the number of the iteration are pos-
itively correlated. Under this circumstance, the adversary
cannot attack imperceptibly. Thus we consider to constraint
the norm of the perturbation less than ζ through projection
V← argmin
V′
‖V −V′‖F s.t. ‖V′‖F ≤ ζ, (4)
which can ensure the Frobenius norm of the perturbation to
satisfy the constraint ‖V′‖F ≤ ζ in each iteration.
DUAttack constructs the universal adversarial perturba-
tion using Algorithm 1, then adds unseen natural images
with the perturbation to fool models. The proposed method
only needs queries in the synthesis phase, the universal per-
turbation can be applied to different images, models and
tasks on real-world settings.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we conduct various experiments on
MNIST (LeCun et al. 1998), CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, Hin-
ton et al. 2009), ImageNet (Deng et al. 2009) and PASCAL
VOC2007 (Everingham et al. 2010) to investigate the effec-
tiveness of DUAttack.
• To evaluate the effectiveness and transferability of the
adversarial examples, we perform the ablation study
with VGG16 (Simonyan and Zisserman 2014) and
ResNet50 (He et al. 2016), we compare DUAttack
with other approaches, including two universal attacks
UAP (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2017) and Singular-
Fool (Khrulkov and Oseledets 2018), and three individual
attacks FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014),
PGD (Madry et al. 2017) and SimBA (Guo et al. 2019).
• To investigate the generality property of cross models, we
compare the fooling rates on different attacked models us-
ing different models to craft the universal perturbation.
Furthermore, to investigate the universality of cross tasks,
we apply the universal perturbation generated from the
classification task to the detection system Yolov3 (Red-
mon and Farhadi 2018), DSFD (Li et al. 2019a).
• Besides, we analyze the effect of the number of training
set for constructing the universal perturbation and com-
pare the performance of the perturbation having stripes
and random noise. We show the performance of DUAt-
tack against several representative defense methods (Guo
et al. 2017; Xu, Evans, and Qi 2017; Das et al. 2017).
• Finally, to validate the efficiency of the proposed attack
method DUAttack on real-world settings, we compare
performance of DUAttack and other attack methods when
attacking the online model from Microsoft Azure.
4.1 Experiment Setup
Models. In universal and individual attacks comparison, we
use VGG16 for all methods to generate the universal ad-
versarial perturbation, which is used to attack ResNet50. In
CIFAR-10 experiments, we train models using training im-
ages from CIFAR-10. The whole networks are trained with
stochastic gradient descent (SGD). All models are trained
with an initial learning rate of 0.05, a weight decay of 0.5
after every 30 epochs with a momentum of 0.9. In ImageNet
experiments, models are pre-trained on ImageNet. For attack
across models, we use VGG16, VGG19 (Simonyan and Zis-
serman 2014), ResNet50, ResNet101 (He et al. 2016) and
GoogLeNet (Szegedy et al. 2015) pre-trained on Imagenet.
For attack across tasks, the attacked models Yolov3 is pre-
trained on COCO (Lin et al. 2014), DSFD is pre-trained on
WIDER FACE (Yang et al. 2016).
Datasets. The proposed attack method, UAP and Singular-
Fool randomly sample N(N = 500) training images from
CIFAR-10 or from ImageNet (with different labels) to gen-
erate universal adversarial perturbation on VGG16. 10,000
test images from CIFAR-10 or 10,000 validation images (not
be included in training) from ImageNet are used for evalua-
tion. For attack across task, 500 training images from PAS-
CAL VOC2007 are randomly sampled to generate a univer-
sal adversarial perturbation. This perturbation is applied to
Yolov3 and DSFD on test images of PASCAL VOC2007.
Parameters. For SimBA, UAP and SimgularFool, we use
their default settings except for the attack distance controlled
parameters. In most experiments, for DUAttack, the step size
 = 0.2 and the number of iteration T = 1000.
Metric. The Frobenius norm of the perturbations is the dis-
tance between the natural images and the perturbation im-
ages, namely ‖Xadv −X‖F . We use the average distance
over images as the metric. Attack success rate under spe-
cific distance evaluates the performance of the attack. For
the untargeted and targeted attack, we compute the fooling
rate ASRuntargeted and ASRtargeted upon examples that
already have been classified correctly by the models and
those have not been classified to the targeted label respec-
tively, namely
ASRuntargeted = (F(X+V) 6= y)/(F(X) = y),
ASRtargeted = (F(X+V) = yt)/(F(X) 6= yt). (5)
For comparsion equally, we show different results with dif-
ferent distance. Besides, the proposed method needs no
query in the evaluation phase, and for universal attack com-
parison, our method is the only one which conducts in the
black-box setting, so we do not compare the query.
4.2 Attack methods comparison
Universal attack comparisonWe compare the performance
of the proposed attack method DUAttack with the univer-
sal adversarial attack methods UAP and SingularFool in the
same setting. We use N = 500 clean images randomly sam-
pled from the training images in CIFAR-10 or sampled from
the validation images in ImageNet to compute the universal
adversarial perturbation through VGG16. Then we evaluate
Table 1: Untargeted fooling rates (%) on universal attack comparison. The universal adversarial perturbation is computed for
VGG16 using only 500 images. The numbers in (·) denote the average `F perturbation distance per image. Note that when
attack VGG16, UAP (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2017) and SingularFool (Khrulkov and Oseledets 2018) are white-box attacks.
The universal perturbation crafted on VGG16 then is transfered to ResNet50.
Method CIFAR-10 ImageNetVGG16 ResNet50 VGG16 ResNet50
UAP 89.94(15.33) 89.61(15.35) 57.78(3933.42) 28.25(3928.86)
SingularFool 88.69(13.98) 88.61(13.99) 56.43(4268.64) 30.95(4266.38)
DUAttack 91.97(13.23) 90.35(13.27) 77.36(3911.77) 43.14(3912.04)
Table 2: Untargeted fooling rates (%) on individual attack comparison. The numbers in (·) denote the average `F perturbation
distance per image. Note that FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014), PGD (Madry et al. 2017) are white-box attacks
when attack VGG16, SimBA (Guo et al. 2019) is individual score-based attack and DUAttack only use 500 images to craft the
universal perturbation. The adversarial examples crafted on VGG16 then is transfered to ResNet50. 1st/2nd best in bold/italic.
As a desicion-based universal adversarial adversary, DUAttack has good transferability.
.
Method CIFAR-10 ImageNetVGG16 ResNet50 VGG16 ResNet50
FGSM 89.77(15.33) 49.28(3.28) 94.75(1115.26) 55.60(1115.43)
PGD 93.75(3.210) 72.38(2.60) 96.10(1008.47) 39.74(1008.44)
SimBA 98.44(1.940) 27.70(3.14) 94.70(1187.92) 2.74(1187.92)
DUAttack 91.97(13.23) 53.26(3.28) 77.36(3911.77) 7.99(1122.93)
10,000 images sampled from the testing images in CIFAR-
10 or the other validation images in ImageNet with the per-
turbation on ResNet50.
As shown in Table 1, the proposed attacked method has
better performance than UAP and SIngularFool on CIFAR-
10. Notice that when attacking VGG16, UAP and Singular-
Fool are in the white-box setting. On ImageNet, when the
attack distances are similar, the fooling rate of DUAttack
on VGG16 is about 20% higher than that of UAP and Sin-
gularFool. When transfered to ResNet50, the fooling rate
of the universal perturbation crafted by DUAttack is more
than 10% than that of UAP and SingularFool. These re-
sults show that the adversarial examples generated by the
proposed method DUAttack have higher transferability than
those constructed by UAP and SingularFool.
Individual attack comparison Besides, we also compare
DUAttack with individual attack methods on CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet. We use Advertorch (Ding, Wang, and Jin 2019)
to perform FGSM and PGD. As shown in Table 2, gener-
ally (ReNet50 on CIFAR-10, ResNet50 on ImageNet), our
proposed adversary has higher transferability than the state-
of-the-art individual score-based attacker SimBA. DUAt-
tack even has better performance than the individual white-
box attackers FGSM when attacking VGG16 on CIFAR-10.
Note that DUAttack only has access to the final inferred la-
bels returned by the models and aims to find a single pertur-
bation for every natural image, while the individual white-
box attackers have knowledge about the hidden layers of the
models and meant to find different perturbations for differ-
ent images. Compare with the individual black-box attacker,
our method only produces the universal perturbation once on
the whole dataset, the individual black-box attacker needs to
generate the corresponding perturbation on every image.
(a) Object Detection (b) Face Detection
Original Adversarial Original Adversarial
Figure 2: Detection results on Yolov3 (Redmon and Farhadi
2018) and DSFD (Li et al. 2019a). (a) Results of clean im-
ages and adversarial images detected by Yolov3 are in the
first column and second column respectively. (b) Results of
clean images and adversarial images detected by DSFD are
in the first column and second column respectively. The uni-
versal perturbation learned in the classification task can also
be applied to the detection task with a good attack perfor-
mance. See supplementary material for additional samples.
4.3 Universality across models
We have shown that the perturbation crafted by DUAttack
generalize well across images, now we investigate its uni-
versality across models. We choose 5 popular models, con-
struct the universal perturbation for each network, and report
the fooling rates on other models with this perturbation on
ImageNet. The number of iterations, the step size for the
proposed attack method are 1000, 0.2 respectively. The de-
sired Frobenius norm of the perturbation is about 4000 and
the number of images for computing the perturbation is 500.
Table 3: Untargeted fooling rates (%) of the perturbations crafted for one model on other models using only 500 images. The
rows indicate the models for which the universal perturbations are computed, and the columns indicate the attacked models
for which the fooling rates are reported. The second column shows the top-1 accuracy (%) of the models on ImageNet. The
perturbation computed by DUAttack generalizes well across models.
Accuracy VGG16 VGG19 ResNet50 ResNet101 GoogLeNet
VGG16 72.11 77.36 68.45 43.14 38.40 36.72
VGG19 73.00 69.69 65.10 40.50 36.31 38.89
ResNet50 76.65 63.16 55.85 40.93 32.87 32.33
ResNet101 77.61 62.74 56.64 37.93 32.82 32.33
GoogLeNet 70.23 62.85 57.28 35.63 30.00 34.63
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Figure 3: Fooling rates on the 10,000 validation set from
ImageNet versus the training set size of N for computing
the universal adversarial perturbation.
As shown in Table 3, the rows are the models construct-
ing the perturbation, and the columns are the models that be-
ing attacked with the perturbation. Table 3 indicates that the
perturbation constructed by a network can generalize very
well across other models, all perturbations computed by a
network have a fooling rate over 30% on other models on
ImageNet. Fooling rates in Table 3 indicate that the attack
performance of DUAttack is related to the capacity and the
classification accuracy of the models. VGG series are more
likely to be cheated. Despite the model VGG series, mod-
els with high classification accuracy have weak robustness,
which indicates a trade-off between the accuracy and robust-
ness of the models. Thorough discussions can be seen in the
articles (Zhang et al. 2019; Raghunathan et al. 2020).
Results in Table 3 shows the great application potential
of DUAttack, as the universal perturbation generalize well
across systems with only access to the top-1 inferred labels
returned by the model.
4.4 Universality across tasks
We have shown that our DUAttack is doubly-universal as the
perturbation crafted for a model generalizes well across data
and models. Now we further estimate the performance of the
universal perturbation on different tasks.
Specifically, 1) we randomly sample 500 images from
training images in PASCAL VOC, utilize these images
to generate a universal perturbation for VGG16 under the
multi-label classification task. 2) We choose Yolov3 trained
on COCO, DSFD trained on WIDER FACE to be the at-
250 500 1000 1500
Number of iteration T
0
200
400
600
800
N
um
be
r
+
-
Figure 4: Distribution of plus and minus operations during
the updating process when the proposed method DUAttack
has different number of iterations.
tacked models. 3) Then we apply the universal adversarial
perturbation to randomly 64 test images. 4) Finally, we uti-
lize these adversarial images to attack Yolov3 and DSFD.
Among 64 test images, 35 images are detected incorrectly
by Yolov3. Some detected results are shown in Fig. 2 (a). For
Yolov3, some objects are missed detection. Nevertheless, the
horse in the first row of (a) and the TV monitor in the second
row of (a) are obvious in the adversarial images, however,
Yolov3 still cannot detect them. Then, from the test images,
we pick out images with faces of people. We use DSFD to
detect these images. some results are shown in Fig. 2 (b). In
the first row of (b), DSFD has false detection on the table.
In the second row of (b), DSFD cannot detect the face of the
baby and has false detection on the hands of the girl. More
examples are included in the supplementary material.
Fig. 2 shows that adversarial examples generated through
the proposed method have high transferability. The univer-
sal adversarial perturbation is trained on multi-label classi-
fication task with VGG16, after being applied to test im-
ages from PASCAL VOC, even can fool Yolov3 trained on
COCO and DSFD trained on WIDER FACE.
4.5 Effect of training set size
Experiments above have shown that the proposed method
DUAttack is triple-universal, as the perturbation can gener-
alize well across data, models, and tasks. We now investi-
gate the performance of DUAttack with different sizes of
the training set. The step size  for DUAttack is 0.2, and
the number of iteration T is 1000. We computed the uni-
Table 4: Fooling rates (%) on MNIST when DUAttack
using different update strategies. DUAttack rand, DUAt-
tack CMAES and DUAttack represent the proposed method
use random sampling, CMAES (Dong et al. 2019) and the
proposed orthogonal matrix with momentum respectively.
Update Startegy Fooling rates (%) Distance
DUAttack rand 44.88 5.09
DUAttack CMAES 68.36 4.79
DUAttack 83.08 4.73
versal adversarial perturbation V for VGG16 using a set of
N(N = 32, 64, 128, 256) images with different labels ran-
domly sampled from the validation images of ImageNet, and
then add other 10,000 benign images from ImageNet vali-
dation set with the universal adversarial perturbation V to
generate adversarial images. Then we use these adversarial
images as the input of VGG16 and ResNet50.
As illustrated in Fig. 3, the fooling rate can be higher if
the training set size is larger. We hypothesize that even when
using only a set of 32 images to compute the universal ad-
versarial perturbation V, the proposed attacke method DU-
Attack can fool more than 50% of the 10,000 images with
less than `F = 4000 attack distance per image, which is
very small for imagenet having images ranging from 0 to
255. In addition, this perturbationV can fool more than 30%
of the 10,000 images when transfer to ResNet50. Note that
the proposed attacked method only have access to the final
inferred top-1 labels from the attacked models, the set of im-
ages for computing the universal adversarial perturbation V
even cannot include all labels on ImageNet (the number of
classes is 1000), these results are significant.
4.6 Analysis of update strategy
For comparing the effectiveness of the proposed method
with different update strategies, we apply random sam-
pling and the covariance matrix adaptation evolution strat-
egy (CMAES) (Dong et al. 2019) , as the update strategy of
DUAttack. We randomly sample 500 images for computing
the universal adversarial perturbation V to attack the online
model from Microsoft Azure. The step size is 0.02, and the
number of iterations is 500.
Results are shown in Table 4. DUAttack rand, DUAt-
tack CMAES and DUAttack represent the proposed attack
method DUAttack using the random sampling strategy, the
covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategy and the por-
posed orthogonal matrix with momentum strategy as the up-
date strategy respectively. As shown in Table 4, the prposed
method DUAttack using the orthogonal matrix with momen-
tum as the update strategy can have the best performance.
When the attack distance is similiar, DUAttack using the or-
thogonal matrix with momentum can fool more than 80% of
the 10,000 images, while DUAttack using the random sam-
pling strategy and the covariance matrix adaptation evolu-
tion strategy just can fool about 45% and 68% of the 10,000
images respectively. This shows that the orthogonal matrix
with momentum is a better strategy than the random sam-
pling strategy and CMAES.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: Universal adversarial perturbations computed by
DUAttack using different update strategies. (a)(b)(c) repre-
sent the universal perturbation computed by DUAttack us-
ing the orthogonal matrix with momentum, CMAES (Dong
et al. 2019) and random sampling respectively.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 6: (a)(d),(b)(e),(c)(f) represent the universal adversar-
ial perturbation computed by UAP (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.
2017), SingularFool (Khrulkov and Oseledets 2018) and
DUAttack respectively. Perturbations on (a)(b)(c), (d)(e)(f)
are crafted on CIFAR10 and ImageNet respectively. Pixel
values are scaled for visibility.
To further analyze why the orthogonal matrix with mo-
mentum strategy can let DUAttack have better performance,
we visualize the universal adversarial pertubation V crafted
by DUAttack using the random sampling strategy, CMAES
and orthogonal matrix with momentum strategy as the up-
date strategy respectively. As shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6,
the universal perturbation computed by DUAttack using the
orthogonal matrix with momentum strategy has more tex-
ture like diagonal stripe. Alex Krizhevsky et al. (Krizhevsky,
Sutskever, and Hinton 2012) showed convolutional kernels
learned by the first convolutional layer of AlexNet, it shows
that CNN especially the top convolutional layers are sensi-
tive to texture like horizontal stripe, barre mark and diagonal
stripe. We also find such results from the experiments that
the proposed method DUAttack with the orthogonal update
strategy has better performance than other methods.
Besides, during the updating process, DUAttack ethier
plus or minus with the perturbation. We further visualize the
distribution of these two operations during the updating pro-
cess. As shown in Fig. 4, in general, the operation plus are
more likely to be choosen for computing the perturbation.
4.7 Attack against defenses
We have investigated the universality of the universal adver-
sarial perturbation computed by the proposed method DU-
Attack across data, models, and tasks, and have examined
the performance of our adversary with different sizes of the
training images. Now we evaluate the performance of our
attack against defenses.
We choose a local spatial smoothing method Spatial
Smoothing (SS) (Xu, Evans, and Qi 2017), a compres-
sion approach JPEG Compression (JC) (Das et al. 2017), a
method modifying the adversarial examples Total Variance
Minimization (TVM) (Guo et al. 2017) and an approach
modifying the training schemes Adversarial Training (AT).
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(b) Untargeted Attack on ResNet50
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Figure 7: (a) (b) represent the classification accuracy of VGG16 and ResNet50 trained with defenses respectively. DUAttack is
applied to these models on CIFAR-10. The perturbation for attacking ResNet50 is generated by VGG16.
We train VGG16 and ResNet50 with SS, JC, TVM and AT
on CIFAR-10. When applying AT, we add the natural im-
ages with the universal perturbation. The perturbations are
all computed for VGG16, then they are added to natural im-
ages for attacking ResNet50. We perform DUAttack against
these defenses using the perturbation with the desired norm
ranging from 0 to 16. The step size and the number of it-
eration for DUAttack are 0.2, 1000 respectively. We utilize
Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (Nicolae et al. 2018) to im-
plement SS, JC, TVM.
As illustrated in Fig. 7, the models have the highest top-
1 accuracy when trained using AT. VGG16 and ResNet50
achieve about 100% accuracy on 10,000 test images of
CIFAR-10. On the contrary, models trained with TVM have
the lowest accuracy, but can partially eliminate the effect
of DUAttack. It should be noted that when the desired `F
norm of the universal perturbation is about 8, the accuracy of
models with these defenses drops to around 50%. When the
distance of perturbation generated by our method becomes
larger (ζ = 16), the accuracy of models is close to 20%, the
classification ability of models has basically been lost.
Figure 7 shows that defenses including modifying the in-
put (gradient masking) and modifying the training schemes
cannot always perform well against DUAttack. The adver-
sary only has access to the final labels returned by the model
but can attack unseen images and models by adding the uni-
versal adversarial perturbation learned from one model, even
these unseen models have defense methods.
4.8 Experiments on real-world settings
In this subsection, to validate the effectiveness of the pro-
posed method DUAttack against real world platforms, we
compare the proposed method with transfer-based attack
PGD, UAP and query-based attack including SimBA on the
online model from Microsoft Azure.
Microsoft Azure We conduct experiments on attacking the
online model from Microsoft Azure in two scenarios. We
use the example MNIST model of the machine learning tu-
torial on Azure as the attacked model and employ it as a
web service. We do not know the machine learning method
and architecture of this model. The only information we can
Table 5: Fooling rates (%) on online Azure model on
MNIST. The numbers in (·) denote the average `F pertur-
bation distance per image. 1st/2nd best in bold/italic.
Method Untargeted Targeted
Individual PGD 67.41(4.75) 23.74(5.43)SimBA 83.50(1.17) 46.56(1.69)
Universal UAP 56.24(7.11) 31.65(5.29)DUAttack 83.08(4.73) 40.47(4.71)
obtain is the outputs of this model.
To compare with the performance of other attack methods
in black-box setting. We utilize PGD and UAP to generate
the perturbation on a 4-layer CNN in white-box setting, and
apply the perturbation to the online MNIST model. We ap-
ply SimBA and our DUAttack to the online model directly
in black-box setting. The results are shown in Table 5. This
experiment in the real-world environment validates our hy-
pothesis – the attacks without transfer obviously outperform
the attacks generated from other models (SimBA > PGD,
DUAttack > UAP). Even our universal DUAttack performs
better than the individual attacks PGD. The results show that
our universal perturbation without transfer is significantly
better than the perturbation generated by UAP, which needs
transfer for achieving black-box attack.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed a method to perform the uni-
versal attack which only has access to the top-1 predicted
labels returned by the attacked models. The learned univer-
sal perturbation can be applied to all benign images on dif-
ferent models and tasks. Experimental results confirmed that
the stripe texture adversarial perturbation have high transfer-
ability, and the adversary can still work well against several
defenses and on the real-world models.
In the future, we will design adaptive adjustment param-
eters to find minimal perturbation which is sufficient to fool
models. Furthermore, we will study on perturbations hav-
ing more kinds of patterns, and improving the robustness of
models to the universal adversarial perturbation.
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